Foreign Policy In Focus - Self-Determination - Regional Conflict Profile

Self-Determination Regional Conflict Profile

Burundi

By Gregory Mthembu-Salter

History

In late pre-colonial times, most of Burundi was ruled by a monarchy, with the throne contested by two clans, the Bezi and the Batare. When German imperial forces arrived in 1899, Mwezi I of the Bezi was mwami (king), though his succession was disputed by the Batare. When Germany's African colonies were confiscated in 1919, Burundi and its neighbor Rwanda were ceded to Belgium as a single colony called Ruanda-Urundi. Like its German predecessor, the Belgian administration at first supported the Bezi, but after 1945, relations between the two deteriorated, as Bezi princes demanded immediate independence.

A UN delegation visited in 1957 to hasten Burundi's independence. In the same year, Bezi princes formed the Union pour le progrès national (Uprona), headed by the mwami's son, Prince Louis Rwagasore. Rwagasore swiftly built a large support base that was predominantly Hutu but with significant Tutsi representation, and after Belgium granted Burundi internal autonomy in 1959, Uprona won communal and legislative elections. In 1961, political opponents, with suspected Belgian assistance, assassinated Rwagasore, denying him the chance to lead Burundi to independence in 1962.

The post-independence period saw clan loyalties receding as the primary point of political reference in Burundi, and a rapid ethnicizing of political competition occurred. This was in large part fueled by developments in neighboring Rwanda, where the government was pursuing a policy of radical Hutu supremacism. The fear of this trend emerging in Burundi, and the influence of the thousands of traumatized Rwandan Tutsi refugees who fled into Burundi, radicalized Burundian Tutsis, particularly in the armed forces, and they became determined to preserve their position at any cost. The country's first post-independence prime minister, Pierre Ngendanduwe, who was from Uprona and a Hutu, was assassinated in 1965, following which Uprona won fresh legislative elections, largely on the strength of the Hutu vote. However, the mwami, Mwambutsa, appointed as prime minister a prince called Léopold Biha, who paid scant attention to the largely Hutu, Uprona-dominated national assembly. Hutu army officers attempted a coup and Mwambutsa fled the country, but the coup failed and Biha subsequently purged many Hutus from the armed forces, leaving it mainly Tutsi. Mwambutsa's son Ntare V became the new mwami in 1966 and named Captain Michel Micombero as prime minister. Micombero toppled Ntare V in a coup two months later and declared Burundi a republic and himself president.

Micombero's Tutsi bias was explicit, and Hutus were marginalized in every sector of public life. Hutu popular resentment grew steadily, and in 1972, Hutu villagers massacred Tutsis in two locations, prompting mass reprisals from the Tutsi armed forces. About 200,000 Hutus were killed, and more than 300,000 Hutus fled Burundi to neighboring countries as refugees. Most went to Tanzania, but many also went to Rwanda, where their vehement anti-Tutsi sentiment helped spark a new round of anti-Tutsi massacres in that country in 1973. Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza ousted Micombero in a coup in 1976 and was himself removed from power in a coup in 1987 by the armed forces commander-in-chief, Major Pierre Buyoya.

Hutu militias drawn largely from massive Burundian refugee camps in northern Tanzania intensified their attacks during Buyoya's rule, prompting army reprisals in 1988 and 1991 that killed thousands of Hutus and forced many others into exile. At the same time, Buyoya launched a political reform program and held a referendum in March 1992, which endorsed a Constitution legalizing multipartyism and the democratic process.

A Hutu former exile, Melchior Ndadaye, founded the Front pour la démocratie au Burundi (Frodebu) later that year. Frodebu quickly attracted mass Hutu support, and Ndadaye and the party triumphed in general elections held in June 1993. Tens of thousands of Hutu refugees began to return home from Tanzania, and Frodebu launched a crash program to install its supporters throughout the civil service. This program had not yet reached the armed forces but was threatening to do so when, in October 1993, soldiers assassinated Ndadaye and other senior Frodebu members, prompting Hutu militias to massacre Tutsis in a genocidal fashion throughout most of Burundi. The armed forces stopped these killings but perpetrated their own. Altogether, nearly 100,000 people were killed.

After a military-installed government failed to win international recognition, Frodebu's Cyprien Ntaryamira became the interim president in January 1994. Ntaryamira was killed in April 1994 when the plane in which he was travelling with Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana was shot down. In September 1994, Frodebu's Sylvestre Ntibantunganya became president, but Frodebu was considerably weakened. Ntibantunganya signed a power sharing agreement with the largely Tutsi political opposition in late 1994, but the pact was rejected by the minister of the interior, Léonard Nyangoma, who left Burundi to form a militia to defeat the Burundian armed forces.

The civil war worsened, and in March 1996, former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere became the official mediator in the Burundian conflict. Nyerere and Ntibantunganya subsequently agreed on the need for a military force drawn from the region to be deployed in Burundi, but the Burundian armed forces refused and forced Ntibantunganya from office. Armed forces commanders then installed Buyoya as president, considering him the most reliable guarantor of the interests of the armed forces and the Tutsi community in general, and regional heads of state retaliated by imposing economic sanctions on Burundi in 1996. At the same time, donors imposed an aid freeze, which was also intended to increase the pressure on the government to negotiate. The sanctions and aid freeze greatly worsened the already severe economic crisis in Burundi, crippling production in most sectors and slashing state revenues. This only exacerbated the struggle by rival Burundian elites for the political power to bestow patronage on their supporters.

Buyoya and Frodebu's internal wing negotiated a new power sharing agreement in 1998 and adopted an interim Constitution legalizing Buyoya's rule. Frodebu joined the government, but Frodebu's external faction, headed by party President Jean Minani, denounced the agreement. Multiparty talks facilitated by Nyerere began in Arusha, Tanzania, in June 1998, and economic sanctions were lifted in January 1999. Two Hutu militia groups, the Forces nationales pour la libération (FNL) and the Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (FDD), who were still fighting the Burundian armed forces, boycotted the talks, and the conflict within Burundi worsened. Nyerere died in October 1999, and former South African president Nelson Mandela became the new mediator. Despite apparently promising Mr. Mandela that they would participate in talks in Arusha, militia leaders never did so, and the civil war dragged on. Some major disagreements between the political parties--such as leadership during the transition and reform of the armed forces--were never resolved in Arusha, but, after considerable pressure from Mandela, an agreement was nonetheless signed in August 2000.

The FNL attacked the capital, Bujumbura, in February and March 2001, and on April 18 and July 22 there were coup attempts by disaffected members of the armed forces. In July 2001, Uprona and Frodebu resolved that Buyoya should remain president for 18 months of the transitional period and would be followed by a president drawn from Frodebu until elections could be held. This agreement enabled the installation of a new multiparty government, which took place on November 1, 2001. The transitional national assembly was inaugurated on January 4, 2002, with Minani elected as its president and the new senate headed by Uprona's Libere Bararunyeretse. The FDD and the FNL have each meanwhile intensified their armed struggles since November 1, despite continued efforts by South African Deputy President Jacob Zuma to negotiate a cease-fire.

Main Actors

The Front pour la démocratie au Burundi (Frodebu) is Burundi's most popular party and enjoys widespread Hutu support but is prone to division, having split twice over the issue of sharing power with the country's Tutsi military. The implementation of the Arusha agreement left Frodebu more powerful than previously, and the party is also more united, but without a cease-fire the army is highly unlikely to allow a Frodebu president. When headed by Rwagasore, the Union pour le progrès national (Uprona) was a national party with strong Hutu representation, but it later changed character and now champions Tutsi interests. Uprona was Burundi's only legal party from 1991-1996. The Uprona Party's president, Charles Mukasi, who opposed Buyoya negotiating with Hutu militias, was replaced by Luc Rukingama, a Buyoya loyalist, in 1998, and the party has since supported the president's position. The Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD) and its military wing, the Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (FDD), were founded in 1995 (the latter in an effort to defeat the Burundian armed forces) by Burundi's interior minister, Léonard Nyangoma, who was also a founder-member of Frodebu. The FDD broke from the CNDD in May 1998, boycotted the Arusha talks, and has continued fighting both in Burundi and in the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where it has been assisted militarily by the Congolese and Zimbabwean governments.

Ethnic Breakdown (approximate)

Proposed Solutions and Evaluation of Prospects

The solution to Burundi's civil war and political crisis, as proposed in the Arusha agreement and grudgingly accepted by most Burundian political parties, is that the new political dispensation must accommodate both the Hutu aspiration to have its numerical majority adequately reflected and respected and the Tutsi aspiration to have its security guaranteed. The mechanism that Mandela proposed to ensure both aspirations leaves parties representing Hutu interests with a slender majority in the transitional government and national assembly. The government is to prepare for general elections after three years, and a new national defense force is to be created, drawn equally from the current Burundian armed forces and rebel militias.

But prospects for the proposed solution are being severely hampered by the continuing civil war. Hutu militias fighting the war claim they are prepared to enter into cease-fire talks but have so far refused to do so, suggesting that their preferred solution remains military victory over the government's armed forces. Such a victory is, however, extremely unlikely. Equally unlikely is any prospect of the outright defeat of the militias, though such a defeat nonetheless remains the preferred option of many Tutsi radicals, particularly within the armed forces.

Role of the U.S.

The U.S. is not a major player in Burundi but has traditionally supported Hutu political aspirations and sheltered Ntibantunganya in its embassy for nearly a year after he was removed from power in 1996. Washington strongly backed the Arusha peace agreement, and then-President Bill Clinton was present for its signing, at the invitation of Mandela. The U.S. supports the current transitional government, has made significant aid pledges to Burundi during the transition, and has repeatedly endorsed UN Security Council appeals for Hutu militias to negotiate a cease-fire.

The U.S. has little direct leverage over the militias, and its appeals to them have thus far fallen on deaf ears. However, the U.S. government does enjoy growing influence over the DRC government, which acts as a patron to the FDD. If so motivated, Washington could use this influence to pressure the DRC government to direct the FDD toward a peaceful settlement.

Sources for More Information

René Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice (Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, New York/Cambridge, 1994).

Liisa Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania (University of Chicago Press, 1995).

Filip Reyntjens, L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en Crise: Rwanda, Burundi, 1988-1994 (Karthala, Paris, 1994).

(Gregory Mthembu-Salter <groglind@iafrica.com> writes on African political and economic developments for a variety of publications. He is currently researching cross-border trade in Africa's Great Lakes region.)