Foreign Policy In Focus - Self-Determination - Regional Conflict Profile

Self-Determination Regional Conflict Profile

Rwanda

By Gregory Mthembu-Salter

History

Rwanda's original inhabitants, a population of hunter-gatherers called the Twa, were largely displaced starting in the 4th century by agriculturalist and pastoralist Bantu peoples. Expanding wealth disparities, particularly in cattle ownership and growing competition for land in the ensuing centuries, due to population growth, generated increasingly hierarchical forms of government. By the 15th century, a monarchy had established itself and had begun to expand its territory through a combination of military conquest and the extension of its patronage. The monarchy controlled nearly all the area currently encompassed by the modern state of Rwanda by the time German colonists arrived in 1903.

Germany ruled Rwanda until the end of WW I, when the colony was transferred to Belgium. Both the Belgian colonial administration and the new Roman Catholic missionaries called the White Fathers, who were the most active proselytizing body in the territory, were race-obsessed. They treated the highly complex issue of the difference between Hutus and Tutsis, which involves factors of heredity, class, and social obligation, as straightforwardly ethnic. The White Fathers and the administration swiftly concluded, on flimsy evidence, that Tutsis and Hutus were of completely separate ethnic origin and that Tutsis were the Hutus' natural masters. They believed that Tutsis were "sub-Aryan" with ancient Christian ancestors, while Hutus were merely ordinary Bantus, worthy to be nothing more than "hewers of wood and drawers of water."

In 1926, colonial officials streamlined "native administration" by merging the formerly separate land, cattle, and army chieftancies at the local level into a single post. Previously, the power of any one of these chiefs over the peasantry had been mitigated by the influence of the other two chiefs, but with this reform the power of the remaining chiefs, who were nearly all Tutsi, over their largely Hutu subjects was greatly increased.

Obligatory commercial agricultural production and an extensive range of compulsory labor requirements were introduced by the Belgians during the 1920s and 1930s, to which were added a host of further labor requirements by chiefs. These changes greatly increased the work load of the largely Hutu peasantry, leaving them little time for their own subsistence farming and fueling their growing resentment of Belgian and Tutsi hegemony.

During the colonial period, the Roman Catholic Church permitted only Tutsis to become priests. After WW II, Hutu catechists led by Grégoire Kayibanda complained about this injustice and received a favorable hearing from the church hierarchy. Eschewing the nonethnic nationalism favored by African contemporaries such as Patrice Lumumba in the Belgian Congo and Julius Nyerere in British-ruled Tanganyika, Kayibanda proudly proclaimed his Hutu identity and developed a doctrine of social revolution that entailed the liberation of the Hutu masses from the yokes of first Tutsi and then colonial domination. During the 1950s Kayibanda received the open support of the church. The colonial administration regarded Kayibanda increasingly favorably too, since his position that emancipation from Tutsis should precede national independence coincided with Belgian intentions to postpone independence as long as possible.

Kayibanda formed a political party called the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR) in 1959, while Tutsi monarchists founded the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR). The MDR orchestrated pogroms against Tutsis that year resulting in thousands of casualties, which the colonial administration notably failed to prevent. An estimated 300,000 Tutsis fled the country as refugees, mainly to Burundi and Uganda. The MDR triumphed against the UNAR in communal elections in 1960 and a year later toppled the monarchy. Belgium granted Rwanda independence in 1962, and Kayibanda became the new republic's first president.

Tutsi refugees tried repeatedly to invade Rwanda during the 1960s, but their efforts resulted in further repression by the MDR government against Tutsis still living in Rwanda. The army chief-of-staff, Juvénal Habyarimana, removed Kayibanda in a coup in 1973, banning the MDR and national assembly and granting himself unchecked legislative and judicial powers. The national assembly was restored in 1981 as a toothless body entirely composed of delegates from Habyarimana's parti unique, the Mouvement Républicain National pour le Développement (MRND), hand-picked by the president himself.

Ugandan-based Tutsi refugees played a key role in Yoweri Museveni's seizing the presidency there in 1986, and many were subsequently rewarded with important posts in his administration. With Museveni's assistance, a guerrilla army called the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was later formed from among these refugees, and in 1990 it invaded Rwanda. By 1991, the RPF had captured most of two northern provinces, but its advance was blocked by French troops (deployed by French President François Mitterrand to defend Habyarimana), resulting in a military stalemate.

In 1991, Habyarimana reluctantly bowed to donor pressure, particularly from France, to legalize multiparty politics, and in 1992 he formed a new multiparty government, which began peace talks with the RPF in Arusha, Tanzania, later that year. The government and the RPF signed a peace agreement in August 1993 that envisaged power sharing and greatly reduced powers for the president. It was also agreed that a UN force would monitor the agreement's implementation, and 2,500 UN troops were deployed in Rwanda in December 1993.

Although the president officially consented to the Arusha agreement, it soon became clear that he and his inner circle (known as the akazu) had done so in bad faith, since they subsequently intensified their earlier efforts of assembling, arming, and openly training anti-Tutsi Hutu militia, generally known as interahamwe (those who work together). The Arusha agreement was unacceptable to Habyarimana and the akazu, partly because it brought Tutsis into the government and armed forces and partly because the diminution of presidential powers prompted the akazu to fear that they would one day be called to account, as some opposition parties had already threatened, for their deeds since 1973.

In a disastrous development for Rwanda's fragile peace process, Burundi's first elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, was assassinated by the country's Tutsi military in October 1993. This hardened the position of the akazu, making it more determined than ever to prevent the implementation of the Arusha agreement.

Stalling tactics by Habyarimana prevented the installation of a new government, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) called an emergency meeting to discuss the issue on April 5, 1994. Returning to Rwanda from the meeting the next day, Habyarimana's plane was shot down over Kigali, probably by his own troops on orders from the akazu, who were fearful that he had finally agreed to allow the Arusha agreement's implementation. Immediately, akazu member Colonel Théoneste Bagasora installed a new government and together with others in the akazu ordered the Hutu militia to begin the elimination of the akazu's political opponents, including moderate Hutus, and the genocide of all Rwanda's Tutsis.

The genocide, in which about 1,000,000 people were killed, lasted until July 1994, when it was stopped by the military victory of the RPF, which had renewed its offensive as soon as the killings began. Belgium withdrew its contingent from the UN force at the beginning of the genocide, and the few remaining UN troops were never mandated by the UN Security Council to prevent the killings.

The RPF then formed a new government, bringing in parties that had signed the Arusha agreement (excluding the MRND) but reserving real power for itself. The RPF's victory precipitated the exodus of over 2,000,000 Hutus mainly to Zaire, orchestrated by the former regime. The refugees were gathered into huge camps by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), where thousands soon died of disease in full view of a huge gathering of the international media, which broadcasted their plight to the world. The former government and its militia quickly established political control over the camps and began preparing to recapture Rwanda. However, in 1996 the armed forces of the new Rwandan government, called the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), forcibly broke up the camps, prompting a mass return of refugees shortly thereafter. Many refugees returned home, believing that the new government would likely leave them alone if they were innocent of genocide. Others, however, headed deeper into the Congo.

The RPA provided extensive assistance to Zairean rebel leader Laurent Kabila in his war against Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko and was instrumental in Kabila's seizing power in May 1997. The RPA initially dominated Kabila's government and armed forces, but Kabila soon judged this a political liability and in mid-1998 ordered the RPA out of the country. Charging Kabila with supporting Rwandan antigovernment militia still present in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire), both the RPA and Ugandan armed forces attempted to overthrow him in August 1998 but were thwarted by the intervention of Zimbabwean and Angolan troops. A bloody conflict ensued and left Kabila and his allies in control of western DRC while Rwanda and Uganda took control of the east of the country. A peace agreement was signed in Lusaka, Zambia, in July 1999 but has never been fully implemented.

The alliance between Rwanda and Uganda in the DRC collapsed during 1999, and their armies later clashed in the strategic northeastern DRC city of Kisangani. Following a concerted diplomatic intervention by Britain, the main Western ally of both countries, tensions have now abated, but diplomatic relations remain strained.

Around 120,000 people have been imprisoned within Rwanda on suspicion of genocide, but only 5,000 have been tried. In order to expedite the process, the government has revived a traditional form of Rwandan justice called gacaca, which involves collective trials before respected members of the community and is due to begin later in 2002. Meanwhile, many of those suspected of orchestrating the genocide, including Bagasora, are being tried in a specially constituted international criminal tribunal in Arusha. The tribunal has completed nine cases so far, acquitting one defendant and convicting the rest of genocide.

Prominent Hutu members of the RPF government either were forced out or resigned from office in 1999 and 2000, including President Pasteur Bizimungu, Prime Minister Pierre-Célestin Rwigyema, and National Assembly Speaker Joseph Sebarenzi, fueling accusations that Rwanda's former Hutu hegemony has been replaced by a Tutsi one. The government angrily denies this, insisting that it is trying to move Rwanda beyond ethnic division. It is for this reason, the government says, that party politics has been forbidden outside the government and national assembly. The government has, however, promised that political party campaigning will be legalized in time for presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for 2003.

Main Actors

The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) is Rwanda's dominant political force, though the level of its popular support is uncertain. The party insists that it is nonethnic, but it is widely perceived both within Rwanda and internationally as essentially Tutsi, not least because of the fall from grace in recent years of nearly all of its prominent Hutu members. Because Tutsis are a minority in Rwanda, the RPF knows it cannot win a free and fair election on ethnic grounds and has instead tried, with some success, to demonstrate to voters its competence in governance and economic management. The RPF came to power through force of arms, and the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), which is solidly loyal to the RPF, remains the backbone of the government. The RPA was extensively deployed in northwest Rwanda from 1997-98 to contain the threat posed by antigovernment militia invading from the DRC, a task at which it was largely successful. Its deployment within Rwanda has since been scaled down, but the RPA is present in large numbers in the eastern DRC, mainly to curb remaining antigovernment militia.

The Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR) was the first party to rule Rwanda after independence, doing so with an explicitly Hutu-supremacist ideology, which it has since officially renounced. The MDR was for several years after 1994 the RPF's major partner in government but has been much weakened by splits at the top of the party and by the ongoing ban on party politics. However, there are signs that the MDR has retained at least some of its Hutu support base and, if permitted to do so, will pose a significant challenge to the RPF in the 2003 elections. The Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda (Alir) is based in the DRC and is composed mainly of remnants of the former Rwandan armed forces and the interahamwe militia. Alir wishes to overthrow the current Rwandan government by force and has received substantial assistance from the DRC government and its allies. DRC President Joseph Kabila insists, however, that this assistance has been terminated.

Ethnic breakdown (approximate)

Proposed solutions and evaluation of prospects

The solution to Rwanda's troubles proposed by the ruling RPF is that, in the interests of national unity, ethnic differentiation should be forgotten as an unwanted and damaging relic of colonialism, and that Rwandans should instead work together to develop and enrich the country. However, the RPF is adamant that the crime of genocide should not be forgotten and must be punished to show that all Rwandans are accountable for their deeds. The punishment would be reduced if those guilty of genocide fully confess to their deeds. The RPF refuses to negotiate with Alir and other remnants of the former regime and has instead called on the international community to support the RPA's ongoing efforts to crush these rebels militarily in the DRC.

Opponents of the government and many international observers say that Rwanda's history and the current de facto Tutsi domination make it impossible to forget ethnicity. They add that if discussion of ethnicity and ethnic domination is forbidden, Rwandan politics will never be normalized and the issue will only resurface in a more dangerous fashion at some later date. However, appeals to the government that these issues should be discussed openly and honestly and without fear of retribution have been rejected as divisionist and even genocidal.

Meanwhile, Alir embraces the same Hutu supremacist position formerly advocated by Kayibanda and Habyarimana, claiming that Rwanda must be ruled by the Hutu majority, and that Tutsis, who they claim are not indigenous to the country, can only remain if they accept their minority status. France and Belgium showed considerable sympathy for this position before 1994, but since the genocide, the argument has been rejected by the entire international community.

Role of U.S.

The U.S. government under President Bill Clinton played a key role in stopping the UN force present in Rwanda in 1994 from doing anything to prevent the genocide, and Washington is widely considered to share responsibility for what happened. Clinton later made a public apology to Rwandans for his role, and the U.S. under his administration became one of the key Western allies of the post-1994 Rwandan government. The U.S. has given and continues to give Rwanda substantial aid, particularly military assistance, and has been a strong defender of Rwanda's intervention in the DRC. The current U.S. administration has so far shown very little interest in Rwanda, or indeed the entire African Great Lakes region, and is apparently content to allow France to guide UN Security Council policy in this regard. This has dismayed many observers, since France has a highly partisan track record in the region and is generally hostile to Rwandan interests. There is considerable scope for the U.S. to display more interest in Rwandan and Great Lakes politics and to pay closer attention to the motives underlying France's policy there. At the same time, U.S. support for Rwanda gives the administration the leverage to encourage the Rwandan government to allow more openness in public political discourse, which could help avert possible future horrors in the country.

Gregory Mthembu-Salter <groglind@iafrica.com> writes on African political and economic developments for a variety of publications. He is currently researching cross-border trade in Africa's Great Lakes region.

Sources for More Information

African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance (London: African Rights, 1994).

Ruddy Doom and Jan Gorus, eds., Politics of Identity and Economics of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region (Brussels: VUB University Press, 2000).

Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will be Killed with our Families: Stories from Rwanda (London: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1998).

Catherine Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (London: Hurst & Co., 1995 and 1997).