Foreign Policy In Focus - Self-Determination - Regional Conflict Profile

Self-Determination Conflict Profile

East Timor

By Anthony L. Smith

History

East Timor has one of the most tragic histories of any people in the post-WWII period. The Indonesian invasion of 1975 resulted in 200,000 deaths, nearly a quarter of the population, which is the worst atrocity per capita since 1945. East Timor was to be destroyed again in 1999, but full independence under a liberal democratic framework is now within reach.

In the sixteenth century, Portugal took control of a number of strategic ports and hamlets from Africa, through South and Southeast Asia, to East Asia. Portugal pursued the related objectives of monopolizing the spice trade and bringing Catholicism to the peoples on these trade routes (the denial of this trade to the Muslim merchants was seen as part of the missionizing agenda). A century later Portugal was surpassed by the Dutch forces that arrived in the East Indies (now Indonesia). But one Portuguese territory--East Timor--survived the hegemony of the Netherlands. The island of Timor was divided between east and west by several agreements. As a result, the eastern half of the island, plus the small enclave of Oecussi on the western side, remained under Portuguese rule, while the western side came under Dutch control later to be ceded to Indonesia in 1949, thus facilitating the effective cultural and nationalistic division of the island under separate colonial masters.

Portugal refused to consider decolonization for its colonies in Africa and Asia until 1974, when the ouster of Portugal's authoritarian right-wing regime facilitated a belated attempt to shed its colonies. Various political parties emerged in East Timor but two pro-independence parties dominated--Fretilin and UDT. After UDT attempted a coup in 1975, Fretilin took power and the Portuguese authorities effectively left East Timor. Fretilin was modeled on Frelimo in Mozambique and inspired by Afro-Marxism, something that touched a raw nerve in Jakarta.

Under Operation Komodo, launched in 1974, Indonesian intelligence agents began operations to interfere in East Timor's politics; and in December 1975 they also facilitated the pretext for a massive Indonesian invasion of the territory when sympathetic leaders signed the Balibo Declaration inviting Indonesian troops in. The Indonesian parliament formally annexed East Timor as the 27th Province in 1976. In absorbing East Timor, some Western countries gave a green light to the invasion--as is clearly evident in recently released U.S. and Australian documents.

The invasion and occupation of East Timor did not come easily--unlike, for example, India's easy absorption of Portuguese Goa in 1961. The East Timorese mounted a substantial resistance campaign, under the rebel army called Falintil, which was led by Xanana Gusmão. For its part, the Indonesian military launched a brutal counter-insurgency strategy that included retaliation against civilians. It is generally accepted (including by the U.S. State Department) that approximately 200,000 (of a pre-invasion population of 800,000) perished during Indonesian occupation, most of them within the first five years of the invasion itself.

There were various factors that kept the East Timor issue alive in the international community. Indonesia's invasion of East Timor was clearly illegal, and few states gave it diplomatic recognition (although Australia was one of the few that did). This illegitimacy converged with another issue: the appalling level of violence in East Timor. This was clearly illustrated for the entire world to see when Indonesian troops massacred around 200 Timorese in Dili in 1991, which a British television crew was able to film. A resolution to East Timor's self-determination demands was not to come until the departure of President Suharto in May 1998. Suharto had resisted all efforts to find a political compromise for East Timor, including special autonomy. His successor, BJ Habibie, reopened negotiations on the issue, and surprised the world in January 1999 when he announced that Indonesia would reconsider the demands, including the possibility of East Timor's independence.

This launched a series of negotiations involving the UN, Indonesia, and Portugal (the latter remained the legal representative of East Timor at the UN during the occupation). On May 5, 1999 an agreement was reached, allowing the UN to conduct a ballot in East Timor. Controversially, the agreement placed security in the hands of the Indonesian security forces, which had already proved totally ineffective in controlling a number of militia groups in the territory (who were funded by elements of the military). The UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) held a ballot on August 30, 1999, in which 78.5% of voters opted for independence. This sparked a rampage by pro-Indonesian militia groups, aided and abetted by Indonesian regular troops. Some supporters of independence were murdered, up to 70% of East Timor's infrastructure was destroyed, and more than 200,000 East Timorese either fled or were forced across the border into West Timor. After enormous pressure, and a clear demonstration that the situation was out of control, Habibie invited a multinational force to enter the territory, and Indonesian forces withdrew. The Australian-led multinational force, called Interfet (International Force East Timor) was 8,000 strong, with half the troops drawn from Australia. Australia and New Zealand formed the sharp edge of the mission, assuming positions on the border and undertaking missions in dangerous areas to curb militia infiltration (still a problem, albeit at a low level). More than twenty nations were involved in Interfet or in the subsequent peacekeeping operation, which came under the authority of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

The number of peacekeeping troops has steadily decreased, but the international force will remain in East Timor at least until the end of 2002 and probably beyond. A 1,500 member East Timor Defense Force has been established to take over the country's security operations. Militia elements continue to be a nuisance factor, in what appears to be an attempt by a hard-core element to undermine the fledging state. On the civil side, UNTAET has had to rebuild the government of East Timor from scratch, establishing even the most rudimentary aspects of governance. In elections during 2001, Fretilin emerged the clear winner and, in coalition with other parties, is forging a new constitution. That constitution will be a presidential model based on France or Portugal, where executive power is shared by a prime minister and a president. The presidential elections to be held some time in 2002 will almost certainly see Gusmão take the position. East Timor will become fully independent in May 2002.

Main Actors

East Timor's two most famous political figures, Xanana Gusmão and José Ramos Horta, are nonpartisan but have great influence: the former is expected to be elected president (and in a de facto sense is already treated as such) while the latter is the foreign minister (and a Nobel laureate). East Timor's largest party, and longtime opposition movement to Indonesian occupation, is Fretilin, which is lead by Chief Minister, Marí Alkatiri, and Speaker of the Constituent Assembly, Lú-Olo. Smaller parties to emerge as players in parliament are the Democratic Party (PD), the Social Democratic Party (PSD), and the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT)--the latter being closely affiliated with Fretilin. The Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), which played such a big role in the events of 1975 and afterward while its leaders were in exile, was left with only two seats in parliament and is no longer a factor on the political scene.

Although no longer a major threat to East Timor, the pro-Indonesian militia groups continue to be a gadfly. The militia groups were a rag tag collection of paramilitaries bearing menacing names like Aitarak (Thorn), Mahidi (Live or Die for Indonesia), or Dadurus Merah Putih (Red and White Typhoon). Although the militias were nominally under a loose structure under João Tavares, Erico Guterres of Aitarak emerged as the most infamous and notorious of the gang leaders.

The Roman Catholic Church plays a prominent role in East Timor, under its universally respected head (by both sides), Bishop Belo (who is also a Nobel laureate).

The United National Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) is under the leadership of the Secretary General's Special Representative, Sérgio de Mello (a Brazilian).

Ethnic Breakdown

Defining ethnicity in East Timor is difficult and a number of divisions can be made and multiple identities established. The East Timorese themselves are comprised of more than a score of Austronesian and Melanesian ethno-linguistic groups, with Portuguese bloodlines also evident, particularly in the urban areas.

In addition to the approximately 800,000 East Timorese in East Timor pre-1999, there were around 60,000 transmigrants, the vast majority of which fled the territory during the violence.

The East Timorese themselves are often divided into two subgroups: the eastern Firaku account for around 30% of the population, while the western Kaladi form 50% (and there are groups that lie outside this divide, such as Oecussi which shares the Dawan language that predominates in West Timor). Independence support in Indonesian times was stronger in the Firaku regions. However this artificial division cuts across Austronesian and Melanesian language groups and may only be meaningful these days as a faint political fault-line. Tetum-Díli, the language of the capital area, Díli, has been promoted as a national language (alongside Portuguese) by East Timorese officials. It is not clear that ethno-linguistic divisions are stark in the territory. The two largest ethno-linguistic groups, Tetum and Mambai, have many dialects and a weak sense of group cohesion.

500 years of Portuguese colonialism and 24 years of suffering under Indonesian rule appear to have created a robust nationalism, but ethnicity cannot be entirely discounted as political division in the future. What marks the East Timorese out from the West Timorese is Portuguese colonialism. The division is complete with the two halves of the island regarding each other as different peoples, and the West Timorese are committed to the state of Indonesia.

Proposed Solutions and Evaluation of Prospects

To a large degree, the security crisis that gripped East Timor in 1999 was put to rest by the Australian-led Interfet intervention. The UN administration in East Timor, despite friction with local leaders, does not face any substantial challenge to its presence, and the vast majority of East Timorese are supportive of the path toward independence.

Three outstanding issues remain. First, securing the East Timor border with Indonesia (West Timor) is a security priority for the territory. Negotiations are underway between the Indonesian military and the UN (and the East Timor military) to demilitarize the border in the long run. But any lasting peace will also have to involve the eventual disarmament and disbanding of the militias that continue to exist in West Timor.

Second, as many as 60,000 East Timorese are still trapped in refugee camps in West Timor. A rigged "ballot" (really a series of interviews) in 2001 purportedly showed that 98% wanted to stay in West Timor--a result the government of Indonesia effectively contradicted when it offered these refugees compensation to return to East Timor. These refugee camps continue to be the domain of the militia groups; reports of extortion, brutality, and sexual violence are widespread.

Third, there exists the issue of dealing with the atrocities of the past through the due process of law. This is seriously complicated by the fact that most of the suspects (Indonesian military officers and civilian militiamen) reside in Indonesia. Indonesia has refused to hand over suspects for any cases (including those involving the deaths of peacekeepers or UN workers), and in spite of international pressure the Indonesian government has demonstrated little progress on promised trials. In East Timor itself, there have been convictions for 11 militiamen and Truth and Reconciliation hearings are due to get underway during 2002. This will most likely involve a process that resembles the South African model that used a combination of reconciliation and sentences for the worst cases to effect justice.

Role of the U.S.

The role of the U.S. in giving a green light to Indonesia's 1975 invasion is now beyond doubt with the release of relevant diplomatic archives in 2001. During 2001 a fascinating encounter occurred between Gusmão and Ramos Horta on a visit to Henry Kissinger, who served as U.S. Secretary of State at the time of the invasion. Kissinger attempted to explain his actions to the two East Timorese leaders on the grounds that communism was a serious threat to the world in the 1970s. But Gusmão has told the East Timorese that they should not dwell on the past and that includes not pointing the finger of blame at the United States.

With the cold war and the communist "bogey" fading into history, U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s began to change markedly in East Timor and elsewhere, although it has remained controversial in many quarters. During the post-1999 ballot violence, the Clinton administration exerted enormous pressure on the Habibie administration to allow a multinational force to take charge of East Timor. This act ensured East Timor's independence, as it is highly doubtful that the international community would have acted without that invitation. The violence of 1999, clearly organized by elements of the military, caused Washington to cut military-to-military ties, and the failure of Indonesia to give appropriate sentences to the militia members who killed a U.S. citizen in West Timor in 2000 has prolonged this ban. Interfet did not include U.S. ground troops, but the U.S. Navy did provide sealift logistical support. In 2001, 1,000 U.S. Marines undertook some training in East Timor.

(Anthony L. Smith <asmith@iseas.edu.sg> is a fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.)

Sources for More Information

James J Fox and D Babo Soares (eds.), Out of the Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction in East Timor (Adelaide: Crawford House, 1999).

Hal Hill and João M. Saldanha (eds.), East Timor: Development Challenges for the World's Newest Nation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001).

Ian Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the Ballot, and International Intervention (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001).

Richard Tanter, Mark Selden, and Stephen R. Shalom (eds.), Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia, and the World Community (Lanham, Md.: Rowan and Littlefield, 2001).