Foreign Policy In Focus - Self-Determination

Self-Determination Conflict Watch is an electronic journal sponsored by Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF), a joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. FPIF, a "think tank without walls," is dedicated to "making the U.S. a more responsible global leader and partner." The project has received a grant from the Carnegie Corporation to advance new approaches to self-determination conflicts through web-based research and analysis. Conflict Watch presents the latest analysis about self-determination from our international network of experts. For more information, please visit our Self-Determination In Focus website at http://www.selfdetermine.org/index.html. We encourage readers to respond to opinions expressed in Conflict Watch as well as to send in unsolicited commentaries (send to <tom@irc-online.org>) about self-determination issues.

Tom Barry, editor of Self-Determination Conflict Watch, is a senior analyst with the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC) (online at www.irc-online.org) and codirector of Foreign Policy In Focus. The IRC is responsible for producing and publishing the Self-Determination Conflict Watch ezine.

The recent rounds of violence between religious groups in India do more than reveal the fragility of India's secular state. They highlight the inability of Indian democracy to combat what is essentially a fascist onslaught.

At first glance what happened in India appears to be another--if extreme--case of religious passion gone awry. A train carrying Hindu activists to the disputed religious site of Ayodhya was firebombed by a mob, killing 58 of the activists. Several days of revenge attacks by Hindus against Muslims followed in the state of Gujarat, killing over 700.

However, India's Hindu Nationalists have always resembled 1930s European fascists more than they do contemporary "fundamentalists." Members of the core organization of Hindu nationalism, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), founded in the 1920s, are given paramilitary instruction, not religious, and wear khaki uniforms reminiscent of Mussolini's brownshirts. While the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), founded in the 1960s, is mainly concerned with religion, it still does not prescribe how Hindus should worship or behave--an impossible task given the diversity of Hindu religious practice.

Instead, like all Hindu nationalists, it is bent on characterizing Muslims as alien and hostile while seeking to unify Hindus around a romantic nationalism, in which military prowess plays a central role. Hindu nationalists' emphasis on international prestige has won them the support of the westernized middle class, typically the target of Islamic fundamentalism. Their focus on demonizing Muslims rather than promoting Hinduism is illustrated even by the dispute over Ayodhya, where extremist Hindu groups destroyed a 16th century Muslim mosque in 1992, sparking nationwide sectarian riots in which more than 2,000 people died.

Hindu nationalists claim that a temple on the same site honoring the birthplace of the Hindu deity, Rama, was torn down to make way for the mosque. For Hindu extremist groups the claim that a temple was torn down to build a mosque--for which there is no concrete evidence--was at least as important as the claim that Rama was born at the site. The destruction of the mosque was commonly spoken of in terms of retaking territory that had been lost to invaders. Hindu nationalists have identified other mosques they wish to destroy, claiming that these too were built on temple sites. For none do they claim the sanctity associated with the birthplace of Rama. Indeed, the purpose of claiming a particular site as Rama's birthplace--for which there is no basis in theology or tradition--was to justify tearing down the existing mosque.

It is this fascist ideology, and the fact that a party espousing it is at the head of the national government, that makes the recent anti-Muslim pogroms in Gujarat so much more disturbing than earlier rounds of riots. As horrific as the recent violence was, more died in 1992. But the political establishment's response this time has been ambivalent and feeble. The paralysis in the political system is emboldening the Hindu extremist organizations responsible for the Gujarat "riots" to press their agenda more forcefully. There are times when India seems to resemble Germany in the 1920s and early 1930s.

The analogy to the rise of Hitler is not one that should be made lightly, but there are many parallels. The Gujarat attacks were not spontaneous expressions of mob rage but were highly organized and brutally efficient, probably identifying Muslim homes and businesses through the use of public records. The state government was almost certainly complicit in the wave of violence that affected the entire state and saw no effort by the police to control it. The central government was slow to dispatch the army, and has attempted to put the focus on the train attack, for which they blame Pakistani intelligence.

The state government initially sought to limit judicial inquiry to investigating the train attack, to use its emergency powers only against those accused of the train attack, and to offer higher levels of compensation to the (Hindu) victims of the train attack on the grounds that they were victims of terrorism. Even many liberal intellectuals and politicians, whose protests forced the state government to retract some of these measures, have tacitly accepted the idea that several days of targeted anti-Muslim violence can be equated with the attack on the train, and even resulted from it.

Worse, there has been no effort by those in power to hold those responsible for the Gujarat attacks accountable. The national government, run by the same party as the state government, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has chosen not to use its constitutional authority to take over the state's administration despite having attempted last year to do so on law and order grounds in another, opposition-ruled state. Although the government has banned militant Islamic groups, it has ignored calls by parties both in the opposition and in its own coalition to do this to Hindu extremist organizations. The involvement of these organizations in the Gujarat violence is widely attested to, and they were banned after they tore down the Ayodhya mosque in 1992.

Worse still, even after the Gujarat riots the government negotiated with the VHP over its plans to begin construction of a temple on the disputed site. The compromise involved an official in the Prime Minister's Office accepting possession of two pillars intended for inclusion in the temple structure. Even though this seriously compromised the Indian state's claims to religious neutrality, the government has congratulated itself for defusing a potentially explosive situation.

(Arun R. Swamy <swamya@EastWestCenter.org> is a fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii.)

NEW MODELS OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN LATIN AMERICA
By Melina Selverston-Scher

Whether through political participation or violent struggle, indigenous people are developing new models to articulate some degree of self-determination within Latin American nations. Indigenous political demands for self-determination range from indigenous representation in national government to autonomy or self-government, depending on the specific context. In the Andes, where the indigenous population is often a majority, the demands tend more toward representation in government. In Mexico, where the indigenous communities occupy the fringe both geographically and otherwise, demands are for autonomous regions.

Self-determination is impossible without control over the necessary economic resources. That control is nearly impossible in the current context of natural resource exploitation, in which benefits are extracted to cities or foreign banks and not reinvested in the exploited territory. That is why most demands for indigenous rights include language calling for changes in the economic model, such as granting subsoil rights to the affected communities.

The meanings of the proposed solutions are still largely contested, but there are three general models: constitutional reform, pluri-nationalism, and autonomy.

In the eyes of many indigenous advocates, it is a mistake to talk about an indigenous problem when what needs to be resolved is in fact a societal concern. The advent of indigenous political parties, the development of new Constitutions throughout Latin America, and the gradual if tortuous establishment of the rule of law in the region all contribute to the common model of establishing a legal framework for the promotion of indigenous rights within the existing national regime. Countries that recently reformed their Constitutions to enshrine notable indigenous rights include: Argentina (1994), Bolivia (1994), Colombia (1991), Ecuador (1998), Nicaragua (1995), Panama (1994), Paraguay (1992), Peru (1993), and Venezuela (1999). A constitutional amendment in Mexico, the 2001 Indigenous Rights and Culture Law, remains contested.

Constitutional rights sought by indigenous people include recognition of the multiethnic nature of society, guaranteed bilingual education, and recognition of collective property rights, among others. Many indigenous groups also include the right to practice aspects of their own political and judicial systems within proposed constitutional reforms, and to varying degrees this has been granted. The current challenge facing indigenous groups is to pursue the implementation of these measures.

Pluri-nationalism--a term formulated in the Andean region to signify political recognition of the multicultural character of these societies--provides another potential model for indigenous self-determination. It can be particularly useful in bridging the inequality that generally is found among different indigenous groups in a country. (In Ecuador, for example, Quichua people dominate the movement, as the Miskito have in Nicaragua.) Although based on similar principles of decentralization, pluri-nationalism focuses on the survival of indigenous cultures within existing nation-states. In countries with a large indigenous population, like Bolivia and Ecuador, indigenous calls for self-determination can be especially threatening to the institutionally weak Latin American states. Yet, the concept of a pluri-national state is fast becoming a part of the political landscape of the region. In fact, a declaration from the meeting of the presidents of the Andean nations last year included a commitment to: "Continue to develop political strategies to recognize and value the ethnic plurality and the multicultural identity of the Andean Nations."

The concept of autonomy is a very important tool, although there are few models of how indigenous autonomy can be implemented. The Nicaraguan case is one of the most important experiments. The Nicaraguan autonomy law--ratified in 1987 and negotiated between indigenous rebels and the Sandinista government as part of the peace accords--was grounded in a series of consultations with communities. The result was a decentralized representational framework that respects local authorities yet guarantees indigenous representation at the national level. However, the sticky questions of who controls natural resource extraction and who polices the communities and the borders were never resolved to the satisfaction of the indigenous leaders.

Similar propositions for autonomous indigenous governments have been hammered out in peace talks in Guatemala and Mexico, but their implementation has been blocked in both cases. In Mexico peace talks collapsed, and in Guatemala the proposals were largely rejected in a public referendum. In Brazil, indigenous groups participated in constitutional reforms and won the right to demarcated indigenous areas as well as the right to defend their borders, though they often lack the resources to do so. One of the most successful examples of autonomy is that of the Kuna in Panama. The Kuna, with informal U.S. support, revolted against the Panamanian government in 1925. As the result of a negotiated settlement, the independent Kuna Congress now exercises full authority over its area. Each indigenous situation is unique, and the practical implications of autonomy need to be worked out both within each national framework and among the indigenous groups who propose it as a model.

From constitutional amendments to demands for autonomy, there is a wide range of proposals attempting to guarantee the rights of indigenous peoples in contemporary Latin America. Whether or not self-determination is the most practical solution, it certainly underlies all of the proposals under discussion. The delicate balance between the independence of indigenous nationalities and their existence within nation-states is one of the most important political challenges in the region today.

Selverston-Scher <melinas@igc.org> is a consultant in Washington, DC, where she is currently monitoring multilateral development bank policies affecting indigenous peoples. She holds a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University.

Eurostep (European Solidarity Towards Equal Participation of People) is a network of 19 major NGOs from 15 European countries. Collectively these groups work in approximately 100 countries. Its two principal aims are first to influence official development cooperation policies of multilateral institutions, and in particular those of the European Union; and second to improve the quality and effectiveness of initiatives undertaken by NGOs in support of people-centered development. By working within the framework of EU policies, Eurostep works to eradicate poverty and invest in social development. Among some of the network's goals and initiatives are cancellation of external debts for poor countries, trade arrangements targeted toward poverty objectives, gender equality, and reform of the CAP (Common Agriculture Policy).

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